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ABSTRACT
Self-replicating technologies pose a challenge to the legal regimes we
ordinarily rely on to promote a balance between innovation and competition.
This Article examines recent efforts by the federal courts to deal with the leading
edge of this policy challenge in cases involving the quintessential self-replicating
technology: the seed. In a recent series of cases involving the invocation of the
patent exhaustion defense by purchasers of Monsanto’s “Roundup-Ready”
genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crop technologies, farmers have
argued that Monsanto’s patent rights do not extend to the second generation of
soybeans grown from a patented first-generation seed. In each case, the Federal
Circuit found for Monsanto and against the farmers. The Supreme Court is about
to take up the issue for the first time.
In this Article, I argue that the Federal Circuit reached the right result in the
Roundup-Ready cases, but that it failed to articulate a satisfactory justification
for its decisions. That justification, I claim, should be that the patent-based policy
set by the Federal Circuit is preferable to alternative legal regimes—such as
trade secret and contract law—because it avoids disincentives to competition,
innovation, and dissemination of new self-replicating technologies while
reducing transaction costs inherent in their commercialization. Importantly,
however, not all self-replicating technologies are identical, and a categorical rule
exempting them from patent exhaustion doctrine is unwarranted. I propose
instead that application of the exhaustion doctrine should depend on the
patentee’s ability to charge supracompetitive prices in its primary market where
consumers are able to substitute secondary-market embodiments.

* Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Most can raise the flowers now,
For all have got the seed.1

Self-replicating technologies, once the subject of theory2 and fantasy,3 are
now upon us. The original self-replicating machine—the living organism—has
already been harnessed by biotechnology engineers and, more to the point, their
patent lawyers.4 The next wave of self-replicating technologies, be they
nanorobots or organic computers, are not far behind.5 Rather than triggering a
“gray goo” apocalypse,6 these technologies are, at present, raising far more
prosaic issues of intellectual property and antitrust law. In particular, they are
challenging businesses, lawyers, and judges to establish a policy framework
that will appropriately balance innovation with competition, allowing self-

1. Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Flower, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TENNYSON
POET LAUREATE

230 (New York, The MacMillan Company 1901) (1884).

2. See generally, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN, THEORY OF SELF-REPRODUCING

AUTOMATA (Arthur W. Burks ed., 1966).
3. See generally, e.g., *BATTERIES NOT INCLUDED (Universal Pictures 1987).
4. See generally, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (engineered
bacteria); Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (transgenic mouse).
5. See generally Tong Wang et al., Self-Replication of Information-Bearing
Nanoscale Patterns, 478 NATURE 225 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v478 /n7368/full/nature10500.html; Robert A. Freitas, Jr., Current Status of
Nanomedicine and Medical Nanorobotics, 2 J. OF COMPUTATIONAL & THEORETICAL
NANOSCIENCE 1 (2005).
6. K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION 2.0: THE COMING ERA OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY 354-55 (20th Anniversary ed. 2006) (“[A]ssembler-based replicators will
therefore be able to do all that life can, and more. From an evolutionary point of view, this
poses an obvious threat . . . . [E]arly assembler-based replicators could beat the most
advanced modern organisms. ‘Plants’ with ‘leaves’ no more efficient than today’s solar cells
could out-compete real plants, crowding the biosphere with an inedible foliage. Tough,
omnivorous ‘bacteria’ could out-compete real bacteria: they could spread like blowing
pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a matter of days. Dangerous
replicators could easily be too tough, small, and rapidly spreading to stop—at least if we
made no preparation . . . . Among the cognoscenti of nanotechnology, this threat has become
known as the ‘gray goo problem.’”).
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replicating technologies to be efficiently developed and commercialized for the
benefit of society.
This Article examines recent efforts by the federal courts to deal with the
leading edge of this policy challenge in cases involving the quintessential selfreplicating technology: the seed. In a recent series of cases involving
Monsanto’s “Roundup-Ready” genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crop
technologies, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been
steadily charting the boundary between patent and antitrust principles as
applied to self-replicating technologies. In each of the Roundup-Ready cases, a
farmer has argued that Monsanto’s patent rights do not extend to the second
generation of soybeans grown from a patented first-generation seed. In each
case, the Federal Circuit found for Monsanto and against the farmer.7 In its
October 2012 Term, the Supreme Court of the United States will take up the
issue for the first time.8
The Roundup-Ready cases are a harbinger of things to come. A number of
similar herbicide-resistant crops are in the pipeline of the largest agribusiness
concerns,9 and other self-replicating technologies lie just over the horizon.10
Moreover, these cases offer a useful lens on the economic issues presented by
self-replicating technologies in general and the efforts to incentivize their
creation and commercialization through law. While Monsanto’s genetically
engineered crop technologies present a host of complex policy issues,11 in this
Article, I will address only the specific issue of patent exhaustion addressed by
the Federal Circuit’s decided cases. Specifically, I will argue that the Federal
Circuit reached the right result in the Roundup-Ready cases, but that it failed to
articulate a satisfactory justification for its decisions. That justification, I claim,
should be that the patent-based policy set by the Federal Circuit is preferable to
alternative legal regimes—such as trade secret and contract law—because it
avoids disincentives to competition, innovation, and dissemination of new selfreplicating technologies while reducing transaction costs inherent in their
7. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling II), 363 F.3d 1336, 1343-44
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I), 302 F.3d 1291, 1296-99 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
8. Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?
FileName=/docketfiles/11-796.htm.
9. Andrew Pollack, A Battle Over an Engineered Crop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/business/energy-environment/dowweed-killer-runs-into-opposition.html.
10. See sources cited supra notes 5-6.
11. Many other issues, such as how to prevent or deal with the escape of engineered
genetic material into non-engineered crop populations, monopolization of the seed market
itself, potential restrictions of follow-on innovations, and the related problem of
evergreening, are explored in Daryl Lim, Rebooting the Bean, ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Agriculture and Food Committee Bulletin (Fall 2012), at 2, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163220.
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commercialization. Importantly, however, this policy analysis also requires us
to recognize that not all self-replicating technologies are identical, and thus that
a categorical rule exempting them from patent exhaustion doctrine is
unwarranted. I propose instead that application of the exhaustion doctrine
should depend on analysis of the relationship between demand for firstgeneration embodiments of a self-replicating technology and demand for
subsequent-generation embodiments, and particularly the patentee’s ability to
charge supracompetitive prices in its primary market where consumers are able
to substitute secondary-market embodiments. This understanding of the stakes
of patent exhaustion doctrine illuminates not only its application to selfreplicating technologies, but its application to patented technologies in general.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background on
the law of patent exhaustion and its complicated relationship to both innovation
and competition policy. Part II describes the case study of self-replicating
technology provided by Monsanto’s technology and the judicial decisions
adjudicating its intellectual property rights with respect to that technology. Part
III critiques the Federal Circuit’s explanation that its rulings were designed to
prevent “eviscerat[ion]” of patents in self-replicating technology by exploring
two alternative policy regimes under which such technologies might be
commercialized—trade secret and contract regimes—and discussing the likely
effects for innovation and competition of channeling inventors of selfreplicating technologies into such alternative regimes. Finding these alternative
regimes unsatisfactory, Part IV goes on to examine the features of selfreplicating technologies that are likely to channel innovators out of the patent
regime and into those unsatisfactory alternatives—principally the ability to
substitute a subsequent-generation embodiment for a first-generation
embodiment—and generalizes from this analysis to draw lessons about the
appropriate scope of patent exhaustion doctrine in general. I ultimately argue
that the applicability of the exhaustion defense ought to depend on judgments
about the appropriate balance between maintaining the incentive to innovation
afforded by the ability to charge a monopoly price for a patented technology
and ensuring access to such technologies for those who are unable to pay that
monopoly price. Inevitably, such judgments will entail fact-specific sensitivity
to both the nature of individual patented technologies and to the structure of
demand for them.
I.

PATENT EXHAUSTION: THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

A patent gives its holder the “right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States.”12 But there are limits to the
patentee’s ability to enforce this exclusionary right, some grounded in concerns
over competition policy. For example, the patent misuse doctrine “forbids the
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
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use of [a] patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted
by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”13 Most
commonly, this doctrine has been invoked to condemn particular tying
arrangements and as such has been modified by statute to align it (in part) with
prevailing principles of antitrust law.14 The doctrine of patent exhaustion, or
first sale doctrine,15 “provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item
terminates all patent rights to that item.”16 It, too, has been identified with
competition policy, although current Supreme Court jurisprudence leaves the fit
between exhaustion and relevant antitrust doctrines open to question.17 Finally,
antitrust law in general remains applicable to the practices of those who trade in
patented technology—particularly as applied to licensing agreements, which
are governed not only by patent law but by contract law.18
Patent law’s first sale doctrine is currently in an uncertain state, with the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court (to say nothing of those courts’
observers) disagreeing on its scope. Within Supreme Court jurisprudence, there
is a distinction between the right to use and the right to make a patented
invention. While the patentee relinquishes the right to control the use of a
patented article upon selling it, such a sale does not authorize the purchaser to
make a newly infringing article—a principle that has historically arisen when
the purchaser (or another downstream actor) repairs or refurbishes the article.19
Moreover, to trigger patent exhaustion a sale of a patented article must be
“authorized,” a requirement that some patentees have successfully contracted

13. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010); see generally Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of

Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399 (2003) (arguing that the
innovation policies underlying patent misuse are not entirely coextensive with antitrust
policy, and particularly not with rule of reason analysis given the prerequisite of market
power for a finding of liability). For an overview of the history and policy of patent misuse
doctrine, see generally Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475
(2010).
15. This Article will use the terms “patent exhaustion” and “first sale”
interchangeably.
16. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); see also
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873) (“[W]hen the patentee, or the person
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the
consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use.”); Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“And when the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.”).
17. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm:
The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2011). Similar
doctrines apply in copyright and trademark law. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008) (codifying the
copyright first sale doctrine); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924) (establishing
the trademark first sale doctrine).
18. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST (2d ed. 2010).
19. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-46 &
n.9 (1961); cf. Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (finding refurbishment
of used and severed patented cotton bale ties marked with a “use once only” restriction to be
an infringement, without discussing the first sale issue).
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around using license restrictions. Thus, where a patentee licenses a
manufacturer to produce articles under its patent but limits that license’s scope,
the manufacturer’s sale of an embodiment of the patent outside of that scope is
“unauthorized.” Such sales will not exhaust the patentee’s rights as to those
articles, at least where the purchaser was on notice of the breach of the
license.20
Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has taken this restricted
license exception to the first sale doctrine one step further, extending it to end
users of patented inventions. The mechanism for this extension is the
“conditional sale” doctrine, under which post-sale restrictions imposed on a
patented article under a contract with the end user of the article (as opposed to a
licensed manufacturer or other intermediary) can prevent exhaustion of the
patentee’s rights with respect to that article. So, for example, in Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., where a patentee transferred possession of a patented
medical device to a hospital pursuant to a label license providing that the
device was for “single use only,” the court held that reuse of the device
constituted not just a violation of the license terms (i.e., breach of contract), but
also could potentially constitute patent infringement.21 The Federal Circuit
relied on numerous patent misuse cases to conclude that “not all restrictions on
the [post-sale] use of patented goods are unenforceable”22 and reasoned that
such restrictions could likewise be used to limit the first sale doctrine. In so
doing, the Federal Circuit seemed to be attempting to align the first sale
doctrine with rule-of-reason analysis under antitrust law, following a similar
effort with respect to patent misuse doctrine.23
Recently, the Supreme Court has pushed back on the Federal Circuit’s
“conditional sale” doctrine and the resulting pressure on the first sale doctrine.
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court clothed
its reversal of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in broad language that appeared
inconsistent with the conditional sale doctrine of Mallinckrodt.25 However, the
holding in Quanta was grounded in the particular facts of the license
agreements at issue in that case, which the Supreme Court interpreted to create
unconditional sales.26 The result was, in some commentators’ view, a missed
20. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938), aff’d on
reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
21. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (1992).
22. Id. at 703-06.
23. Id. at 706; cf. sources cited supra note 14.
24. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
25. Id. at 638 (“The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law
to control postsale use of the article.”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 501 & nn.60,
64; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F.Supp.2d 575, 585-86 (E.D.
Ky. 2009) (“Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio. The Supreme Court’s broad
statement of the law of patent exhaustion simply cannot be squared with the position that the
Quanta holding is limited to its specific facts.”).
26. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 635-37.
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opportunity: an apparent but indirect rejection of the Federal Circuit’s rule-ofreason approach without any guidance as to the appropriate relationship
between first sale doctrine and competition (or innovation) policy.27
There are thus at least two important distinctions on which current patent
exhaustion doctrine turns: between “using” and “making” an invention, on the
one hand, and between conditional licenses and conditional sales, on the other.
The use/make distinction can be derived entirely from Supreme Court
precedent, while the license/sale distinction represents a possible divergence
between Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. Each of these
distinctions turns out to be highly formalistic in practice and can destabilize as
market actors innovate not only their technologies, but also their business
strategies for exploiting and commercializing those technologies. Selfreplicating technologies in general, and the Roundup-Ready cases in particular,
highlight this doctrinal instability, as the next Part demonstrates.
II.

ROUNDUP-READY ROUNDUP

A. The Federal Circuit’s Approach
Monsanto is a manufacturer and former patentee28 of a potent herbicide—
glyphosate—that it markets under the brand name “Roundup.”29 Glyphosate
operates by inhibiting the operation of an enzyme essential to the production of
amino acids in plants.30 Monsanto has also engineered a variant gene that can
produce a glyphosate-tolerant version of the inhibited enzyme and has obtained
patent protection for the modified gene, plants and plant cells that incorporate
the modified gene, and related genetic engineering technologies necessary to
the production of plants and seeds composed of those cells.31 Monsanto
markets seeds for glyphosate-tolerant crops under the “Roundup-Ready” brand
name.32
Roundup-Ready seeds are produced either by Monsanto itself or by
independent seed manufacturers operating under license from Monsanto. Under
such a license, seed manufacturers obtain the right to insert the chimeric
Roundup-Ready gene into the germplasm of their own seeds (allowing their
seeds to express the glyphosate-resistant trait), subject to two conditions. First,
they must pay Monsanto a royalty for every bag of seed they sell. Second,
27. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 491.
28. U.S. Patent Nos. 3,977,860 (filed June 11, 1973), 3,799,758 (filed Aug. 9, 1971).
29. Monsanto, THE HISTORY OF ROUNDUP (last visited Feb. 16, 2013)

http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement/pages/history-roundup-ready.aspx.
30. Id.
31. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993), 5,633,435 (filed Sept. 13, 1994).
A description of the development of these technologies into commercial-scale seed
production can be found in Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-88 & nn.1-2
(N.D. Miss. 2004).
32. Monsanto, supra note 29.
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every such sale of seed must be made pursuant to a “Technology Agreement”
with the purchaser, rather than as an unconditional sale of the chattels
themselves. In other words, every farmer who wants to buy Roundup-Ready
soybean seed must take a restricted license to Monsanto’s patents, and must
pay a price that includes pass-through of Monsanto’s royalty.33
The Technology Agreement purports to impose several restrictions on
farmers who purchase Roundup-Ready seed. First, farmers must agree to use
the purchased seed to grow a commercial crop in a single season only. Second,
they must agree not to provide the purchased seed to anyone else for planting.
Third, they must agree not to use the seed for breeding, research, or similar
purposes, nor to allow anyone else to do so. And finally (and most importantly
for present purposes), they must agree not to save any of the crop grown from
the purchased seeds to be replanted, either by the farmer-licensee or by anyone
else.34
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the defendant farmer acceded to the
Technology Agreement and then intentionally violated its terms by saving and
replanting crops grown from the licensed seed for two successive seasons.35
Monsanto sued him for patent infringement and breach of contract, and
prevailed in district court, first obtaining a preliminary injunction36 and
ultimately winning summary judgment on the central questions of liability.37 In
both instances Monsanto overcame McFarling’s assertion of patent misuse and
first sale defenses. In finding for Monsanto, the Federal Circuit did obliquely
refer to its “conditional sale” exception to the first sale doctrine,38 but did not
resolve the first sale defense on that basis. Rather, it reasoned that “[t]he
original sale of the [first-generation] seeds did not confer a license to construct
new seeds, and since the new seeds were not sold by the patentee they entailed
no principle of patent exhaustion.”39 The Federal Circuit thus drew on the
Supreme Court’s distinction, noted above,40 between using a patented article
and making a new article.
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the farmer claimed to have acquired
Roundup-Ready seed from one of Monsanto’s licensed seed manufacturers in
33. McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339; Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 134445 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796); Scruggs,
459 F.3d at 1333.
34. Id.
35. McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1339.
36. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling (McFarling I), 302 F.3d 1291, 1296-99 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (affirming preliminary injunction).
37. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 2002 WL 32069634, at *3-5 (Nov. 5, 2002).
38. McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1299 (quoting B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997), a conditional sale case).
39. Id.
40. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342-46 &
n.9 (1961); cf. Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (finding refurbishment
of used and severed patented cotton bale ties marked with a “use once only” restriction to be
an infringement, without discussing the first sale issue).
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an unrestricted sale—i.e., without agreeing to Monsanto’s Technology
Agreement, in violation of Monsanto’s license to the seed manufacturer itself.41
The Federal Circuit again rejected an asserted first sale defense, on two
grounds. The first was identical to the holding in McFarling: that the secondgeneration seeds had been made by Scruggs rather than sold to him.42 The
second relied on the conditional license exception to patent exhaustion: Scruggs
had never in fact purchased Monsanto’s patented goods in an “authorized” sale,
since Monsanto did not authorize its licensed seed manufacturers to make
unrestricted sales of seeds containing its patented technology and Scruggs was
on notice of that restriction.43 Having invoked both the use/make distinction
and the Supreme Court’s conditional license rule, the Federal Circuit went on
to announce a sweeping new principle: “Applying the first sale doctrine to
subsequent generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the
rights of the patent holder.”44
In Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, an Indiana farmer seemed to have found a
clever way around Monsanto’s license terms. Rather than saving seed from his
first-generation crop, he sold that crop into the commodity market, then later
went to a “grain elevator”—a wholesaler in the commodity grain and oilseed
market—and purchased commodity soybeans to be used as seed for a second
crop.45 Because approximately 94% of Indiana’s soybean acreage is planted
with herbicide-resistant seed, many of these commodity soybeans expressed the
Roundup-Ready trait, meaning Bowman was able to clean and plant the
purchased commodity soybeans and treat them with glyphosate.46 Bowman
then saved the seed grown from that second crop for replanting.47 Because
Monsanto’s Technology Agreement expressly permits farmers to sell secondgeneration soybeans to grain elevators as a commodity, Bowman argued that
Monsanto’s patents were exhausted as to the commodity seeds he purchased
from the local grain elevator, leaving him free to use them as he saw fit.48
As ingenious as Bowman’s workaround of the Monsanto Technology
Agreement may seem, it did not amuse the Federal Circuit. That court once
again invoked the use/make distinction, holding that even if Monsanto’s rights
in the commodity seeds were exhausted, once Bowman planted those seeds and
raised the resulting plants he had made an unauthorized newly infringing article
as to which Monsanto retained its patent rights.49 Again, the court held,

41. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
42. Id. at 1336.
43. Id.; cf. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938),

aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
44. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336.
45. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 420 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1346.
49. Id. at 1348.
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applying first sale doctrine to self-replicating technologies would “eviscerate”
the patents for such technologies.50
B. Tensions With (and Within) Supreme Court Precedent
In the Roundup-Ready cases, and particularly in Bowman, the Federal
Circuit relied heavily on the use/make distinction to find end users of
Monsanto’s self-replicating technology to be bound by the restrictions in their
license agreements not only as a matter of contract law but as a matter of patent
law. Indeed, this would seem to be the only way Bowman’s activities could
result in legal liability, as he complied with the express terms of his
Technology Agreement. But of course, the application of the use/make
distinction in the Roundup-Ready cases ignores the elephant in the room: the
only and intended “use” of seeds or any other self-replicating technology
necessarily “makes” a newly infringing article—this is the defining
characteristic of self-replicating technologies. Indeed, Monsanto’s Technology
Agreement explicitly permits end-user farmers to plant, grow (i.e., make),
harvest, and sell articles reading on Monsanto’s patents. What that agreement
purports to restrict is the farmer-licensees’ commercial uses of those patented
articles, the making of which is explicitly authorized. Thus self-replicating
technologies, by their nature, destabilize the use/make distinction and render it
an inadequate tool for defining the scope and limits of patent rights.
For the same reason, the other distinction in patent exhaustion doctrine—
between conditional licenses and conditional sales—breaks down when applied
to self-replicating technologies. Viewed in one light, Monsanto’s Technology
Agreement can be analogized to the field-of-use restrictions in the
manufacturer’s license in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric
Co.51—it places restrictions on the markets into which farmers in their capacity
as soybean manufacturers can sell the finished products for which Monsanto’s
patented technology is an input. But of course, the Technology Agreement can
just as easily be analogized to the label license in Mallinckrodt52—it places
restrictions on how farmers, in their capacity as end-users of soybean seed, can
use the seed they have purchased. There would not seem to be a basis for
favoring one of these analogies over the other as a matter of doctrine; again,
farmers who agree to Monsanto’s Technology agreement are, at one and the
same time, purchasers of patented articles (the seeds) and licensees in the
manufacture of patented articles (plants grown from those seeds). This presents
a problem: as end users, Supreme Court precedent might well immunize seedsaving farmers from patent liability—though perhaps not contract liability53—

50. Id.
51. 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938), aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
52. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703-09 (1992); cf. sources

cited supra note 14.
53. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008)
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while recent Federal Circuit doctrine would not.54 As licensees, however, even
Supreme Court doctrine would hold seed-saving farmers liable for infringement
for exceeding the limit of their licensed manufacturing rights.55 Again, selfreplicating technologies collapse the distinctions at the heart of current patent
exhaustion doctrine. The user of such technologies is by definition also a maker
of them; his purchase of a patented article is necessarily a license to
manufacture more.
The Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on patent exhaustion, in
Quanta (and its predecessor, United States v. Univis Lens Co.56), do not appear
to offer a way out of this dilemma. As noted above, at least some judges and
scholars believe Quanta abrogated the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale
doctrine.57 But there has been no suggestion that Quanta abrogates the older
line of Supreme Court cases holding that a conditional license can operate to
render a sale “unauthorized” and thus outside the scope of the first sale
doctrine. And it is precisely the distinction between a “sale” and a “license”
that self-replicating technologies confound. So even if we ignore the Federal
Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine, we are still left with the question: are the
farmers properly understood as purchasers (such that patent exhaustion applies)
or licensed manufacturers (such that it doesn’t)?
Perhaps other aspects of the Court’s opinions in Quanta and Univis Lens
can offer some guidance on this question. Note that in each of those cases, the
patentee authorized the sale of articles that were not literal embodiments of the
patented inventions at issue, and yet those sales were held to trigger
exhaustion.58 In Univis Lens, the Court reasoned that the sale of lens blanks
“capable of use only in practicing” a patent for finished lenses triggered
exhaustion.59 In Quanta, it reasoned that a semiconductor chipset “substantially
embodies” a method patent for a computer system consisting of the chipset plus
standard parts and common processes,60 and therefore triggers exhaustion upon
its sale. Similarly, a seed could well be understood to “substantially embody”
the plant that will grow from it, insofar as it requires only standard agricultural
processes to produce that very plant. Moreover, a seed for such a plant is

(noting the possible availability of contract remedies even where patent exhaustion applies).
Of course other laws, such as antitrust law, might be invoked to hold the post-sale
restrictions in Monsanto’s technology agreement unenforceable. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note
17, at 541 (discussing the divergence—or lack thereof—between first sale doctrine and
antitrust scrutiny of contractual restrictions).
54. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 304 U.S. at 181-82; Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at
703-09; cf. sources cited supra note 14.
55. Id.
56. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
57. See Quanta, 533 U.S. at 617, 635-38; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 501
& nn.60, 64; Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575,
585-86 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
58. Univis, 316 U.S. at 248-50; Quanta, 533 U.S. at 630-35.
59. Univis, 316 U.S. at 249.
60. Quanta, 533 U.S. at 633.
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capable of use (as a seed) only in doing precisely that. If the Supreme Court’s
language is read sufficiently broadly, it could be understood to require the
conclusion that the sale of a seed exhausts a patent on the plant grown from that
seed, just as the sale of a chipset exhausts a patent for a computer system
incorporating the chipset or the sale of a lens blank exhausts a patent for a
finished lens made from that blank.
But something about the nature of self-replicating technologies seems to
generate an intuitive resistance to this doctrinal analysis. That resistance, I
think, rests on an important distinguishing feature of self-replicating
technologies that is absent from the technologies at issue in Quanta and Univis
Lens: the ability to generate multiple embodiments of the patented invention.
Each chipset in Quanta could be used to make at most one computer system at
any given time; the same could be said of the lens blanks in Univis Lens. But a
single seed has the potential over time to generate a virtually unlimited number
of additional seeds. This basic feature of self-replicating technologies, which
the Federal Circuit warned could “eviscerate” patents on them, doesn’t really
help us resolve the use/make dilemma or the license/sale dilemma. But it does
suggest reasons for treating self-replicating technologies differently from other
technologies with respect to patent exhaustion. While those reasons are not
reflected in the distinctions drawn in extant doctrine, the discussion in the next
two Parts will attempt to flesh them out.
III.

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

The Federal Circuit held in the Roundup-Ready cases that a secondgeneration soybean is a different “article” than the first generation seed from
which it grew, asserting that any alternative result would “eviscerate”
Monsanto’s patent. But this is a question-begging response to an unnecessarily
formalist question, and there are other, better reasons why it might be
undesirable to hold that a patentee’s sale of a single embodiment of its selfreplicating technology exhausts patent rights with respect to the second, third,
or nth generation of the technology that is propagated from that first
embodiment. Moreover, these other reasons are consistent not only with the
rationale for granting patent rights in the first place, but with the procompetitive principles that justify limiting those rights through exhaustion
doctrine.
To get at these reasons, we must look beneath the Federal Circuit’s
repeated assertion that applying patent exhaustion to subsequent generations of
self-replicating technologies would “eviscerate” the patent for such
technologies. While rhetorically powerful, the word “eviscerate” does little to
illuminate the actual policy implications of the doctrinal choice presented in the
Roundup-Ready cases. It does, however, imply a judgment that whatever
policies patent protection serves would be undermined by applying patent
exhaustion doctrine in this way.
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A. Self-Replication and Self-Disclosure
Ordinarily we think of patent protection as serving to spur innovation. The
promise of supracompetitive returns under a time-limited patent monopoly is
thought to provide the incentive to undertake costly investments in innovation
that otherwise would not be made (due to the disincentive effects of free-riding
by follow-on competitors who do not have to bear the fixed costs of the
investments).61 But beneath this well-worn “incentive to invent” story is a nest
of complications. First, many industries seem to be hotbeds of innovation
notwithstanding their disqualification from or disuse of patent or any other
form of intellectual property protection.62 Second, many patentable inventions
may go unpatented because their creators do not think the cost of obtaining a
patent is justified by the potential returns on the patent monopoly, or because
they opt instead for other forms of protection, particularly trade secret
protection.
Professor Strandburg has developed a helpful framework for understanding
this second group of complications. Strandburg distinguishes between “selfdisclosing inventions”—those that “are easily copied from their commercial
embodiments”—and “non-self-disclosing” inventions, which are not.63 As she
notes, “[t]he free-rider ‘incentive to invent’ theory does not apply to non-selfdisclosing inventions,” because the creator can commercialize the invention
without running the risk of free-riding competitors copying it. For such
inventions, the inventor will likely choose between patent protection and trade
secret protection based on the relative cost of each approach (determined
largely by the costs of prosecuting and defending a patent compared to the
costs of maintaining secrecy) and the relative return to each approach
(determined largely by the expected life of the patent compared to the expected
length of time the secret can be maintained).64 For self-disclosing inventions,
however, secrecy is not a viable option, and some other means of securing the
inventor a return on investment (such as a patent monopoly) will be required to
bring the invention to market.65
61. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962).
62. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF
ECONOMY (2012) (exploring the positive relationship between imitation and innovation in
several industries that either cannot or do not access intellectual property protections).
63. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83.
64. See id. at 110. Strandburg’s original framework does not account for the relative
cost of obtaining a patent or maintaining secrecy, but others have noted that this comparison
is highly relevant to inventors—particularly startups and other small firms—considering
which form of legal protection to pursue. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues
of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 331 (2008).
65. Strandburg, supra note 63, at 109 (“For such self-disclosing inventions . . . the
primary function of the patent system is to increase the period of market exclusivity enough
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The distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions
offers a compelling policy argument in favor of the Federal Circuit’s decisions
in the Roundup-Ready cases, and a useful tool for the analysis of selfreplicating technologies generally. Put simply: self-replication is an extreme
form of self-disclosure. Self-replicating technologies don’t merely teach
competitors how to practice a new invention, they supply such competitors with
a factory as well. So for novel technologies that we believe have characteristics
of public goods and therefore warrant a proprietary right to the inventor in the
first place,66 self-replication poses an additional barrier to such appropriation.
Granting an inventor a property right only in the first generation of a selfreplicating technology merely pushes the free-rider problem that patent
protection purportedly solves down to subsequent generations.
To see how this free-rider problem might play out, consider what
incentives would be generated if the Federal Circuit had come out the other
way in the Roundup-Ready cases—i.e., if patent exhaustion applied to the nth
generation of a self-replicating technology not only for n = 1, but for n ≥ 1. We
can refer to this as the “Exhaustion Scenario.” How would we expect a patentee
to respond to such a legal regime? And what do we think would be the
implications of that response both for innovation and for competition?
We can begin to answer this question by noting the origins of exhaustion
doctrine in what Professor Hovenkamp calls “the leverage theory,”67 the idea
that in the absence of a first sale defense, patentees might use the leverage of
the patent monopoly to extract a “double royalty” from downstream market
actors.68 In the context of tying doctrines in antitrust law, this theory has drawn
criticism from Chicago School economists and defense from other
economists.69 And there are suggestions in the fight over Roundup-Ready
technology that Monsanto’s licensing scheme amounts to the kind of “doubledipping” royalty collection that leverage theory adherents abhor in the tying
context.70 So perhaps the only effect of the Exhaustion Scenario will be that
to provide a sufficient patent return to give an incentive to invent.”).
66. See sources cited supra note 61.
67. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 511-14.
68. Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863) (“Patentees . . . are entitled to but
one royalty for a patented machine.”). Leverage theory continues to linger beneath the
surface of exhaustion doctrine to this day; as Professor Hovenkamp notes, it was an element
of the ultimately vindicated district court judgment in the Quanta case. Hovenkamp, supra
note 17, at 512 & n.110, citing LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc. 2002 WL
31996860, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (“The doctrine is designed to prevent a patentee
from receiving a double royalty on a single patented invention.”).
69. Compare Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (arguing that only a single monopoly profit can be earned even when
bundling a product for which the seller has market power with a product for which it does
not), with Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) (arguing that the single monopoly profit theory
only obtains under limited conditions that are not typical of all tying arrangements).
70. McFarling II, 363 F.3d at 1341 (“In McFarling’s words, ‘[b]y prohibiting seedsaving, Monsanto has extended its patent on the gene technology to include an unpatented
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inventors of self-replicating technologies will be limited (properly!) to a single
royalty stream.
The problem with this analysis is that the legal regime of the Exhaustion
Scenario operates to foreclose the extraction of monopoly rents not only from
downstream secondary market actors and separate markets, but also from laterperiod players (including repeat players) in the primary market for the patented
good itself. In the market for agricultural seeds, for example, the ability of seed
purchasers to quickly manufacture competing seeds would make it difficult if
not impossible for the inventor of a new seed technology to maintain a price
above marginal cost for more than the time it takes to propagate one or two
new generations. Generalizing, we could conclude that where certain
conditions obtain—such as a significant share of demand coming from repeat
or later-period purchasers, a relatively brief generational period compared to
the patent term, and a cost of creating the technology that is greater than the
premium that could reasonably be captured in a single generation’s first-period
sales—we would expect the Exhaustion Scenario to dissipate inventors’
incentives to bring self-replicating technologies to market. In the RoundupReady cases, for example, Monsanto might only be able recoup its investments
in Roundup-Ready technology by selling its first generation of seeds to
individual farmers for thousands (millions?) of dollars per bag, and at that price
the market would be unlikely to clear (especially considering that any
purchaser would face the same threat of follow-on competition). This is in
essence the same dilemma Strandburg identifies for self-disclosing
technologies.71 So one possible outcome of the Exhaustion Scenario is
diminished innovation: a decrease in investments in new technologies, and a
corresponding decrease in their production.72
But there are alternatives to bringing a technology to market other than
declining to invest in the technology’s development in the first place. An
inventor might try to avoid the free-rider problem, not by declining to create a
self-replicating technology, but by declining to sell it. Thus, a second possible
outcome in the Exhaustion Scenario might resemble a trade secrecy regime
combined with a program of vertical integration, particularly for technologies
that can serve as a factor of production for other goods or services. In the
Roundup-Ready example, Monsanto might decide that rather than selling
soybean seeds, it should grow its own soybeans and then process them into the
various downstream products for which soybeans are an input. This turns out to
be a startling array of products, ranging from edible goods like vegetable oil
and soy sauce, to agricultural supplies like livestock feed, to industrial products

product—the germplasm—or God-made soybean seed which is not within the terms of the
patent.’”).
71. Strandburg, supra note 63, at 109.
72. This conclusion is typical of earlier treatments of the subject of this Article. See,
e.g., Jason Savich, Note: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Negative Impact of Patent Exhaustion on
Self-Replicating Technology, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 127-29 (2007).
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like adhesives, textiles, plastics and biofuels.73 And importantly, some of these
products will disclose the genetic technology at the core of Monsanto’s patents
to competitors and some will not, depending on the processing involved at
various stages of the production chain. In the Exhaustion Scenario, we might
therefore expect Monsanto to decline to allow its technology to be used to
make end products that would disclose that technology, and to make other nondisclosing products for which its technology is an input in-house under
conditions of secrecy. We can find this state of affairs disagreeable on both
innovation and competition policy grounds.
With respect to innovation policy, the Exhaustion Scenario may result in
diminished dissemination of technology compared to what we would expect
under the legal regime developed by the Federal Circuit in the Roundup-Ready
cases. This conclusion can be thought of in terms of the “make-or-buy”
question typical of economic analysis of firm boundaries. As Professor Coase
explains, we can think of the degree of vertical integration of a firm as a
function of the comparative transaction costs involved in using the price
mechanism as opposed to the hierarchical organization of the firm to direct
factors of production.74 In the Exhaustion Scenario, however, the relevant
question is not “make-or-buy,” but rather “make-or-sell.” The primary
transaction cost at issue in this case, if we can call it that, is the risk of
catastrophic free-riding. That cost may be greater or less depending on the
extent to which the technology at issue is disclosed by the product being sold.75
In general, we would expect the creator of a self-replicating technology to
withhold it from the production chains for products that would disclose the
technology to end users, while vertically integrating production chains for
products that pose no danger of such disclosure.76 So returning to the RoundupReady example, Monsanto might be willing to make and sell highly refined
industrial products derived from soy, but not edible products in which genetic
material might still be present, with the result that the latter markets would not
benefit from access to Monsanto’s technology. Contrast this with the Federal

73. Amer. Soybean Ass’n, SOYBEANS’ MANY EDIBLE USES, http://www.soystats.com/
2011/edibleuses.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013); Amer. Soybean Ass’n, SOYBEANS’ MANY
INDUSTRIAL USES, http://www.soystats.com/2011/ industrialuses.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2013).
74. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter
eds. 1991).
75. Cf. Julia Porter Liebeskind, Knowledge, Stragtegy, and the Theory of the Firm, 17
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 93 (1996) (documenting advantages integrated firms enjoy over
distributed markets in the protection of information from expropriation).
76. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Information, 9 J. LEG.
STUD. 683, 715-18 (1980) (arguing that firms will vertically integrate to profit from valuable
confidential information), citing Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (arguing that
vertical integration offers a way for asset-owning firms to minimize the risk of opportunistic
appropriation of rents by contracting counterparties).
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Circuit’s regime, under which Monsanto may license its technology widely to
soybean producers and allow those soybeans to be sold as a commodity for any
downstream use without fear of free-riders competing away the rents flowing to
its patent on the underlying genetic technology. This contrast demonstrates the
extent to which the Exhaustion Scenario could curtail dissemination of a useful
technology to areas of commerce that might benefit from it.
Similarly, with respect to competition policy, the Exhaustion Scenario
could encourage monopolization of downstream markets that might otherwise
remain competitive, leading to higher prices and lower output than would be
the case under the Federal Circuit’s approach. This is because the vertical
integration strategy described above gives inventors of cost-saving selfreplicating technologies the opportunity to use those technologies to charge
prices above the inventor’s marginal cost but below its rivals’ marginal cost in
downstream markets, even if other firms would otherwise have competitive
advantages in those markets. Thus, the Exhaustion Scenario could lead to a
competitive landscape that may generate higher surplus for the inventor, but
only at the cost of foregoing greater increases in consumer surplus under the
Federal Circuit’s regime. Taking the Roundup-Ready cases again as an
example, I argued above that in the Exhaustion Scenario Monsanto would have
a strong incentive to vertically integrate into non-disclosing downstream
markets while withholding its technology entirely from disclosing markets. In
particular, it would likely bring in-house the production of end products that
would not disclose its genetic technology—soy-fed livestock, or soy-based
textiles, or industrial adhesives, for example—because otherwise it would have
no way of profiting from the use of its technology as an input into those
markets without running the risk of free-riding. Under the Federal Circuit’s
approach, in contrast, Monsanto’s ability to protect itself against free-riders
through patent law allows multiple producers in both disclosing and nondisclosing downstream markets access to Roundup-Ready soybeans as an input.
This allows for competition among such downstream producers with respect to
competitive advantages other than access to Roundup-Ready soybeans, which
we would expect to reduce prices and increase output in those downstream
markets even further than the availability of Roundup-Ready technology alone.
In sum, the trade secrecy regime implied by the Exhaustion Scenario is
objectionable both on innovation and competition policy grounds. Perhaps for
these reasons, the arguments of those who disagree with the Federal Circuit’s
approach in the Roundup-Ready cases generally do not rest on such a trade
secret approach. Instead, advocates propose that contract remedies—which are
at least arguably not affected by patent exhaustion77—are sufficient to protect
the interests of a patentee of self-replicating technologies. For example, Ms.
Yee Wah Chin, one of the attorneys representing the interests of Monsanto’s
farmer customers, argues that “Monsanto could have licensed seedmakers to
sell seed embodying Monsanto technology on condition that the second77. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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generation seed be either consumed or sold to buyers who agree to either
consume the seed or isolate that seed from other seed and sell the seed only for
consumption.”78 More generally, patentees of self-replicating technologies
might require all purchasers of embodiments of those technologies to agree to
pay additional royalties on subsequent generations and/or to require their own
customers either to take a similar license or to agree not to generate additional
embodiments.
There are several problems with this approach. First, it offers only contract
remedies in the event of a breach, which differ meaningfully from patent
remedies (particularly with respect to the availability of injunctive relief).
Second and more importantly, the transaction costs generated by a contract
approach are likely to be significantly higher than the approach adopted by the
Federal Circuit in the Roundup-Ready cases. In a contract regime, every
downstream player in every market for which soybeans are an input would
have to take a license from Monsanto, generating additional transaction costs
(especially bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement costs) at each layer of the
market ecosystem. Moreover, at least some monitoring and enforcement costs
would likely be shifted under a contract regime from the patentee to its
licensees, who are likely to face significantly higher costs than the patentee
(given the patentee’s expertise with its technology) and to introduce agency
costs79 into the mix (given the relatively weak incentive of Monsanto’s
licensees to prevent free-riding). Finally, in the event the technology somehow
escapes this web of contracts, it is unlikely that Monsanto could be made
whole. This is because it would have rights only against those parties with
whom it is in privity of contract. Once the technology escapes the chain of
privity, its ability to continually produce increasing numbers of embodiments in
which Monsanto’s patent rights are exhausted would render those patents
largely useless. Moreover, even if such an escape were the provable result of a
licensee’s breach,80 a single licensee would be unlikely to have the resources to
compensate Monsanto for such a catastrophic loss.81 Indeed, this risk alone
(and a patentee’s recognition of it) is likely to cause the contract regime to
collapse into the secrecy regime described above, with all its inherent

78. Yee Wah Chin, Inexhaustible: Patents on Self-Replicating Technologies, 3
LANDSLIDE (May/June 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1609794, at 5.
79. For an overview of the theory of agency costs, see generally Kathleen M.
Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 57
(1989).
80. It is entirely plausible that such an escape could occur without any breach of
contractual obligations. See generally, e.g., Hilary Preston, Note, Drift of Patented
Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2003)
(discussing the challenge to patent doctrine of the problem of “drift” of genetic material from
genetically modified crops to neighboring farms); Paul J. Heald & James Charles Smith, The
Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (2006)
(undertaking an economic and legal analysis of the drift problem).
81. Of course, there need not be a breach of license for a self-replicating technology to
escape the chain of privity.
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drawbacks.
In sum, even though the Federal Circuit’s approach in the Roundup-Ready
cases seems to limit the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied to
self-replicating technologies, and even though that doctrine is supposedly
designed to foster competition and the dissemination of innovative
technologies, the analysis above suggests that the alternative—what I have
labeled the Exhaustion Scenario—actually fares worse in policy terms. In
particular, the Exhaustion Scenario seems likely to generate higher transaction
costs, decreased investments in innovation, decreased dissemination of
innovation, and reduced competition in downstream markets. This may seem to
be a counterintuitive result, and accordingly we can and should question some
of the assumptions underlying the foregoing analysis.
B. Qualifications and Objections
One potential—and fundamental—objection to the foregoing analysis is
that the patent incentive is unnecessary to secure production of self-replicating
technologies, and thus the scope of patent rights in such technologies should be
limited wherever possible.82 This is a species of the general critique of the
“incentive to invent” thesis in intellectual property law.83 The types of selfreplicating technologies at issue in the Roundup-Ready cases are fairly new to
the patent system, but they are not at all new to commerce. Unrestricted
transfers, seed-saving, and follow-on improvements were the engine of
innovation in new agricultural varieties for centuries, and no patent monopoly
was needed to ensure a plentiful and steadily increasing variety of novel and
improved agricultural products.84 Early interventions of the patent system into
82. This argument, which sees a restrictive patent exhaustion doctrine as a kind of
balancing mechanism against overbroad patent rights in the patent system at large, is similar
to one made by Professor Merges in support of allowing patent misuse policy to be more
muscular than antitrust tying policy so as to balance out other potentially anticompetitive
advantages conferred on patentees. See generally Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 793, 797 (1988)
(“[P]roponents of a unified antitrust analysis overlook the fact that patent misuse serves as a
valuable counterweight to equitable doctrines that favor the patentee.”).
83. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623 (2012) (claiming that external or pecuniary incentives are in general
not needed to secure socially valuable innovations); see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005) (arguing that whatever incentives may be needed to spur
innovation they do not entail the complete capture of social benefits by the innovator).
84. See generally NOEL KINGSBURY, HYBRID: THE HISTORY AND SCIENCE OF PLANT
BREEDING (2011). Kingsbury’s account suggests that the flourishing of new varieties and
commercial-scale seed companies in the period from the late eighteenth century to the early
twentieth century depended not on the availability of patent monopolies, but on the returns to
a reputation for consistent production of high-quality innovations—more a trademark story
than a patent story. See id. at 83-141. Of course, the poor understanding of genetics during
that period combined with the difficulty of propagating desirable traits without such an
understanding meant that many new varieties were not strictly self-replicating in the sense
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the market for plant varieties also limited appropriability without any apparent
cost to innovation. Breeders’ rights under the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA)85
were limited to asexual reproduction (e.g., propagation by grafts and cuttings
from the original patented plant itself),86 while the Plant Variety Protection Act
of 197087 explicitly included a seed-saving right that is essentially equivalent to
the position advocated by McFarling in his battle with Monsanto.88 In the
interim between those regimes and the utility patent regime consolidated by
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,89 the “Green
Revolution” that transformed world agriculture with huge gains in productivity
through innovative breeding programs was accomplished largely on the
strength of publicly and philanthropically funded institutions and researchers,
not patent grants.90 In short, the historical evidence in favor of the “incentive to
invent” theory for self-replicating technologies is not especially strong.91
Assuming that we, nevertheless, remain committed to the patent system as
a component of our innovation policy, it is still not at all clear that all

under consideration here. See id.
85. Plant Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 71-245, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930).
86. Id. (excluding sexually reproduced plants and tubers from plant patent protection);
see also Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding that infringement under the successor to the PPA requires reproduction by grafting,
cutting, and other physical divisions of the original patented plant, rather than by seed or by
independent cultivation).
87. Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”), Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970).
88. Compare PVPA § 113, 84 Stat. at 1555, codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2543
(granting farmers a right to save seeds produced by patented plants), with McFarling I, 302
F.3d at 1299 (arguing for extension of the PVPA’s seed-saving right to Monsanto’s
genetically engineered seeds).
89. 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001) (holding that neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant
Variety Protection Act forecloses utility patent protection for plant varieties under the Patent
Act, which does not include the farmer’s seed-saving privilege).
90. See generally, e.g., Peter B.R. Hazell, Green Revolution, in THE OXFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC HISTORY (Joel Mokyr ed. 2003). See also Andrew Pollack, The
Green Revolution Yields to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/15/science/the-green-revolution-yields-to-the-bottomline.html (“The gene that spurred the green revolution in the 1960’s—creating high-yield
grain and helping alleviate world hunger—was provided to Dr. Norman E. Borlaug by
Washington State University. ‘If that happened today,’ he said, ‘Washington State would
take out a patent and license it to DuPont or Monsanto or somebody.’”).
91. One possible objection to this argument is that the type of genetic engineering
technology at stake in the Roundup-Ready cases requires significantly more capital to
produce than earlier forms of agricultural innovation, and thus requires the additional
incentive of the patent monopoly in order to encourage the requisite capital formation. But
this objection founders somewhat upon the immense public and philanthropic investments
underlying the Green Revolution (see supra note 90), as well as the fact that much of
Monsanto’s own technology was developed at a public research university. See Monsanto v.
Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584, 587 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (describing contributions to RoundupReady technology by a researcher at the University of British Columbia); Univ. of British
Columbia, A Brief History of the University of British Columbia, U. BRIT. COLUM.,
http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/hist_ubc.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (charting the
history of the University of British Columbia as a public institution).

Winter 2013]

SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES

249

industries, nor even all self-replicating technologies, will present the same set
of incentives as hypothesized in the foregoing discussion.92 I have already
suggested that the problem of downstream free-riding on self-replicating
technologies might only obtain under certain specified conditions.93 More
generally, the structure of demand and the nature of downstream uses of any
particular self-replicating technology are likely to influence whether a shift of
the free-rider problem into subsequent generations of that technology is likely.
As an example, imagine a replication-capable virus used as a vector to
deliver genetic therapies specifically designed to target a particular patient’s
cancer.94 True, the technology’s usefulness may hinge on its ability to selfreplicate from a relatively small number of initial embodiments.95 But the
additional embodiments created may not affect follow-on demand from the
purchaser of the first embodiment—who, if treatment is successful (and, sadly,
even if it is not), is likely to exit the market. Nor would those embodiments be
likely to affect demand from other consumers whose cancers and immune
systems might be sufficiently different to render another patient’s treatment
useless or even harmful, even if subsequent-generation embodiments could be
successfully, safely, and economically harvested from an earlier purchaser for
reuse elsewhere. In short, nth-generation embodiments of self-replicating
technologies used in medicine—particularly personalized medicine—may not
significantly affect demand for first-generation embodiments, because the
nature of those technologies may render nth-generation embodiments poor
substitutes for first-generation embodiments.
Contrast this hypothetical example with markets for commodities like
soybeans, and it becomes apparent that not all patents for self-replicating
technologies will necessarily be “eviscerated” should a purchaser of one
embodiment use it without restriction to generate more. Importantly, this
difference does not appear to map to the use/make distinction or the
purchase/license distinction. Those distinctions thus appear unlikely to capture
economically relevant variations in the structure of demand across current or
potential future self-replicating technologies. Accordingly, some other doctrinal

92. Cf. generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (advocating recognition of industry-specific differences in the
appropriate scope of patent protection and identifying doctrinal policy levers for tailoring
protection accordingly).
93. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Mark A. Kay et al., Viral Vectors for Gene Therapy: The Art of
Turning Infectious Agents into Vehicles of Therapeutics, 7 NATURE MED. 33 (2001)
(presenting an overview of this developing area of biotechnology); Charlotte Dalba et al.,
Replication-Competent Vectors and Empty Virus-Like Particles: New Retroviral Vector
Designs for Cancer Gene Therapy or Vaccines, 15 MOLECULAR THERAPY 457 (2007)
(discussing the benefits and risks of replication-capable viral vectors).
95. See Dalba et al., supra note 94, at 460-61 (noting that replication-defective vectors
have failed in cancer gene therapy, but replication-capable vectors show promise for more
efficient and thorough transduction to cancer tissues with minimal spread to non-targeted
tissues).
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tools for capturing these differences are warranted if we want patent exhaustion
doctrine to reflect sound innovation and competition policy.
IV.

SUBSTITUTION AND THE COPYRIGHT ANALOGY: BALANCING INCENTIVES
AND ACCESS

I propose that a more fruitful approach to setting the scope of exhaustion
doctrine may be found in the type of economic analysis typical of antitrust law.
As Professors Lemley and McKenna have pointed out, something like antitrust
market definition is already endemic to intellectual property law,96 and is a
standard part of lost-profits damages analysis in patent law.97 They propose
that such analysis may inform exhaustion doctrine as well, insofar as used
goods are often the most likely substitutes for new goods covered by an
intellectual property right.98 I would take their insights a step further, and argue
that the concept of substitution—the cross-elasticity of demand at the heart of
market definition in antitrust law99—is key to understanding the economic
implications of exhaustion doctrine for self-replicating technologies, and
perhaps for patent law in general.
Specifically, we should recognize that the “evisceration” feared by the
Federal Circuit appears to be evisceration of the monopoly power that allows a
patentee to charge a supracompetitive price for a first-generation embodiment
of its technology. It is the fear that, left unchecked, competition from nthgeneration embodiments sold by purchasers of first-generation embodiments
will ultimately supplant demand for first-generation embodiments sold by (or
under the authority of) the patentee. It is, in other words, a fear of substitution.
After all, nth-generation embodiments of self-replicating technologies may well
be perfect substitutes for first-generation embodiments. In terms of market
definition analysis in antitrust law, we might conclude that the different
generational cohorts of self-replicating technologies exhibit perfect crosselasticity of demand and that they unquestionably comprise a single
undifferentiated market. Thus, the threat inherent in applying exhaustion
doctrine to self-replicating technologies is that exhausted nth-generation
embodiments will swiftly cannibalize the market for first-generation
embodiments.
This is a peculiar threat that is not present in other forms of competition
that patentees might face. Lemley and McKenna rightly note when discussing
exhaustion doctrine that used goods are often the most likely substitutes for
96. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012).
97. Id. at 2070-71.
98. Id. at 2115-17.
99. As Professor Hovenkamp points out in his response to Lemley and McKenna’s
article, concepts like substitution and cross-elasticity of demand may be better understood as
(perhaps superior) alternatives to market definition rather than as proxies for it. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2141-42 (2012).
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new goods,100 but they are typically not going to be perfect substitutes. For
example, they may have suffered wear that makes them less functional,
durable, or desirable than new goods; or they may require the outlay of
additional costs (over and above the cost of a purchase authorized by the
patentee) in order to bring them up to a level of quality sufficient to render
them acceptable substitutes for new goods. Similarly, a patent confers a right to
exclude others from accessing the precise technological solution to a problem
that the patent claims, though it does not affect the right of others to devise
other technological solutions to the same problem.101 As Professors Fromer
and Lemley argue in forthcoming work, patent law’s implicit distinction
between technical and market substitutes may spur salutary competition to
generate alternative (and potentially superior) solutions to the commercial
problem addressed by a patent,102 but again, perfect cross-elasticity of demand
between such alternatives is unlikely. While both of these forms of
competition—from used goods and from alternative solutions to a common
problem—might divert some demand from a patented technology, neither
seems to threaten the type of perfect substitution that would unravel the
patentee’s monopoly in the patented technology itself.
Perhaps this threat can best be thought of by analogy to a different area of
intellectual property law: copyright. The danger to which the Federal Circuit
seemed to respond in the Roundup-Ready cases is essentially identical to the
danger that is thought to justify the reproduction right in copyright law—
another legal tool to prevent purchasers of an article from generating multiple
identical articles.103 Consider Professor Landes’s and Judge Posner’s canonical
economic analysis of the reproduction right:
While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protection . . . is often
high, the cost of reproducing the work . . . is often low. And once copies are
available to others, it is often inexpensive for these users to make additional
copies. If the copies made by the creator of the work are priced at or close to
marginal cost, others may be discouraged from making copies, but the
creator’s total revenues may not be sufficient to cover the cost of creating the
work. Copyright protection—the right of the copyright’s owner to prevent
others from making copies—trades off the costs of limiting access to a work

100. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 98, at 2115-17.
101. This feature of the patent system has spawned a long history of format wars, from

the electric current war between Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse to the battle
between Sony and Toshiba over standards for high-definition DVDs. Notably, these contests
are fought and decided in the marketplace, not in courts or the Patent Office.
102. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, Audience and Substitution in IP
Infringement
(Oct.
10,
2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/sites/camlaw/files/fromer.pdf (“Subsequent inventors can develop
a variety of market substitutes that are not also technological substitutes without running
afoul of patent law. This market substitution benefits consumers and helps drive the progress
of science and technology.”).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive
rights . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . .”); William M. Landes and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first
place.104

Landes and Posner may as well have been speaking here about the application
of patent protection to self-replicating technologies.
Of course, copyright law has its own exhaustion defense—and a statutory
one at that.105 But notably, that defense modifies the copyright owner’s
distribution right, but not his reproduction right.106 If we were to apply an
analogous principle in the Roundup-Ready cases, we might allow a farmer to
resell (i.e., distribute) the seeds he purchases, but not to use them to make
additional seeds (i.e., reproductions), at least as a matter of intellectual property
law. This conclusion resonates strongly with the use/make distinction in patent
law’s exhaustion doctrine, but again founders on the inseparability of use and
replication. Unlike a copy of a copyrighted work, an embodiment of a selfreplicating technology cannot be used by its first purchaser prior to resale
without creating a new embodiment. So a mechanical extension of the
distribution/reproduction distinction of copyright law to patent exhaustion
doctrine ends up giving the purchaser of an embodiment of a self-replicating
technology significantly narrower rights than the purchaser of a copy of a
copyrighted work. We might therefore eschew formal analogies and take a
closer look at the policy justifications for copyright’s exhaustion doctrine—and
particularly the role in those policies of substitution—to inform our analysis of
patent exhaustion as applied to self-replicating technologies and more
generally.
One of these justifications in particular is informative. As Professor Reese
explains, one argument in favor of copyright’s exhaustion doctrine is that it
mitigates some of the more unfortunate results of intellectual property law’s
policy of using monopoly rights to incentivize innovation.107 In particular, an
exhaustion defense to infringement liability allows for at least some expansion
of access to a copyrighted work beyond the pool of consumers willing and able
to pay the copyright owner’s monopoly price, without unduly threatening the
copyright owner’s ability to charge that monopoly price in the first place.108 It
is, in essence, a policy lever to balance the incentives to innovation that
intellectual property rights provide against the access to knowledge that they—
at least temporarily—restrict. This view of exhaustion doctrine’s role is
consistent with the argument raised above that intellectual property rights ought
in principle to be limited where possible,109 and with the classic Jeffersonian
characterization of intellectual property monopolies as “embarrassment[s]” to
104. Landes & Posner, supra note 103, at 326.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (qualifying the distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3),

but not the reproduction right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)).
107. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C.L. REV. 577, 583-92 (2003).
108. Id.
109. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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be grudgingly tolerated rather than fundamental rights to be zealously
reinforced.110
This understanding of the role and the stakes of exhaustion doctrine—and
particularly the role of substitution in determining its scope—offers far more
useful tools for distinguishing among the cases and hypothetical cases
discussed in this Article than the various doctrinal distinctions on which they
currently rest. For example, take the discussion of Quanta and Univis Lens
above, where it was noted that language of those cases might be read to give
the farmers in the Roundup-Ready cases a defense.111 The intuition against this
result, as I noted, may be rooted in the recognition that a single exhausted
embodiment (or substantial embodiment) is somehow meaningfully different
from a potentially unlimited number of exhausted nth-generation
embodiments,112 but we can now go further and explain why that distinction
ought to be deemed relevant. Put simply, it is because extending the exhaustion
doctrine to cover such nth-generation embodiments would scotch the balance
between incentives and access. True, it would expand access to the patented
technology greatly, but only by flooding the market with perfect substitutes that
make it impossible for the patentee to maintain a supracompetitive price for
first-generation embodiments. It is this inability to charge a supracompetitive
price that threatens to negate whatever incentive to innovation patent law
affords, and thereby creates the incentive to resort to the alternative
unsatisfactory regimes analyzed in Part III.
This same framework of balancing incentives against access can similarly
help us to explain the distinction between Roundup-Ready seeds and the
engineered viral vector described at the conclusion of Part III.113 Here, it is not
the number of nth-generation embodiments that matters, but the extent to which
any nth-generation embodiment is a good substitute for a first-generation
embodiment. Because the nth-generation viruses are likely only useful to the
person who purchased the first-generation virus that produced them, and
because such a person is unlikely to be able to obtain a suitable nth-generation
virus without first obtaining a first-generation virus, it is unlikely that holding
nth-generation viruses exhausted would have any effect on the patentee’s
ability to charge a supracompetitive price for first-generation viruses, thus
obviating the need to resort to legal regimes other than patent law. Conversely,
holding such nth-generation viruses exhausted would be unlikely to
significantly expand access, while failing to so hold might give a patentee

110. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1903). For a skeptical view of the historical and jurisprudential relevance of Jefferson’s oftcited characterization, see generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
111. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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significant power to restrict access in potentially harmful ways.114
The foregoing discussion not only demonstrates the power of the functional
analysis developed in this Article in distinguishing among good and bad
exhaustion claims, but it illustrates the inability of the formalist analysis in
extant precedent to do so. Comparison of Quanta and Univis Lens on the one
hand with the Roundup-Ready cases on the other suggests that the fact that a
defendant is “using” an embodiment is not a sufficient condition for the
exhaustion defense to apply. Conversely, comparison of the Roundup-Ready
cases and the hypothetical viral vector example suggests that the fact a
defendant is “making” an embodiment is not sufficient to demonstrate that the
exhaustion defense should fail. The latter comparison similarly demonstrates
that self-replication need not be in itself a bar to an exhaustion defense. In
short, neither the use/make distinction nor the ability of a technology to selfreplicate are sufficient factual predicates for determining the applicability of the
exhaustion doctrine. In all instances, some recourse to the concept of
substitution—and underlying it a meaningful analysis of the nature of the
technology at issue and the structure of demand for it—is necessary to draw the
relevant distinctions. Ultimately, some judgment about the appropriate balance
of access and incentives must be brought to bear as part of that analysis.
We see these principles at work in the Supreme Court’s earlier repair and
reconstruction cases: American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons115 and Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Co.116 In Simmons, the disposable
nature of the cotton bale ties at issue likely rendered a suitably refurbished tie a
very good substitute for a new one, and it seems likely that a single
embodiment might profitably be refurbished for reuse more than once.117 This
combination of facts might well lead a court to conclude that allowing
downstream players to refurbish the patentee’s products could seriously affect
the patentee’s ability to charge a supracompetitive price for new
embodiments.118 In Aro Manufacturing, in contrast, the issue was whether a
secondary market seller could supply an unlicensed replacement part for a
component of the patentee’s product (the fabric of a convertible car top) that
was susceptible to much more rapid wearing out than the rest of the product.119
Allowing such downstream activity might well lengthen the period of repeat
114. For example, if suitable means of measurement are available, the patentee might
use replication as a basis to meter its pricing, potentially allowing it to capture more surplus
but also potentially pricing out those with the greatest need for the technology. This might be
a particularly salient concern for medical technologies.
115. 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
116. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
117. Simmons, 106 U.S. at 91-93 (noting that the defendant purchased severed
fragments of used bale-ties in bulk and riveted them back together).
118. Id. at 92 (noting that the patentee sold its bale-ties new at 6 cents per pound while
the defendant purchased used and severed ties as scrap at 1.25 cents per pound).
119. Aro Mfg., 365 U.S. at 337-38 (“The components of the patented combination,
other than the fabric, normally are usable for the lifetime of the car, but the fabric has a much
shorter life.”).
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demand for new embodiments, but probably not to the extent that the patentee
would be unable to charge a supracompetitive price for new embodiments
(particularly where its products were mainly purchased by automobile
manufacturers for factory installation in new cars).120 Of course, these are both
issues of degree—in either case the patentee might respond to the alleged
infringer’s conduct by raising its price to capture whatever surplus it might lose
to secondary market activity, which could reduce demand in the primary
market but could also generate complex price discrimination dynamics. The
question then becomes one of judgment: whether such a price increase would
end up narrowing demand for new embodiments to such an extent as to
undermine the incentive to innovate (or, conversely, that insufficient new
embodiments would be created to supply the secondary market, undermining
the policy of expanding access to technology).
This question of judgment may also help shed light on the distinction that
has recently divided the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in their patent
exhaustion jurisprudence: the distinction between a conditional license and a
conditional sale.121 While a full exploration of that distinction is beyond the
scope of this brief Article, it seems to raise the same questions as have been
discussed here. Again, these questions address the substitutability of a used
secondary market good for a primary market good, the effects of such
substitution on the ability of a patentee to charge supracompetitive prices in the
primary market, and the balance between the incentives that those
supracompetitive prices provide and the access to technology that they curtail.
Attempting to characterize a particular transaction as either a license or a sale is
not likely to be especially helpful in ascertaining these types of market
dynamics. It would probably be more useful to consider the effect of enforcing
the post-transaction restrictions the patentee seeks to impose on access to the
patentee’s technology, and conversely the effect of refusing to enforce those
restrictions on its ability to charge a supracompetitive price sufficient to recoup
its investment by some other means within the patent system. Such questions
are likely to be significantly more complex than the analysis in this Article,
particularly in light of the broad array of alternative transactional arrangements
by which a given technology might be commercialized and the varying degrees
of market interventions a court might have to consider in deciding whether a
particular transactional arrangement strikes an appropriate balance between
incentives and access.122 But ultimately, this appears to be the fundamental

120. Id. at 337 (“Tops embodying the patent have been installed by several automobile
manufacturers in various models of convertibles.”).
121. See sources cited supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
122. For example, in a case like Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed.
Cir. 1992), we might be uncomfortable with a court deciding that the patentee ought to
charge more for new devices—squeezing some customers out of the primary market—for
the purpose of encouraging development of a secondary market. The incentives facing a
monopolistic seller in such a circumstance are actually quite complex, even under the
simplifying assumption that secondary market goods are not differentiated from primary
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question implicated by judicial decisions on the scope of exhaustion doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Given how little we can presume to know about the future development of
self-replicating technologies, it is likely unwise to try to set a bright-line rule
today to govern the rights of downstream users for all such technologies that
may arise tomorrow. Fortunately, the Supreme Court appears to be highly
attuned (perhaps to a fault) to this danger.123 What would be welcome as the
Supreme Court considers the Bowman case is an attention to function over
form, and a due regard for the effects of a rule on innovation, competition, and
access to technology throughout and across markets, rather than an effort to
justify selection of one out of two equally plausible characterizations of a
particular transaction. So long as we continually ask ourselves what incentives
will be created by holding a patent exhausted in a particular set of
circumstances, and how those incentives will affect the scope of competition
and innovation going forward, the self-replicating technologies of the future
need not throw the doctrine of patent exhaustion into disarray. To the contrary,
they may be uniquely suited to clarifying the economic issues at the root of
exhaustion doctrine, as this Article has argued. In particular, self-replicating
technologies may present unique problems of secondary-market substitution,
undermining the ability of a patentee to charge supracompetitive prices in its
primary market and thereby leading innovators to seek out non-patent means of
appropriating the value of their innovations. But while many self-replicating
technologies can present such problems, it is by no means certain that all selfreplicating technologies will do so, and this Article’s exploration of what
makes self-replication such a threat to a patentee has illuminated the
fundamental economic issues implicated by the scope of the exhaustion
defense. Rather than attempting to set the boundaries of exhaustion doctrine by
reference to unstable formal categories (be they self-replicating/non-selfreplicating, use/make, or license/sale), courts would better serve the innovation
and competition policies underlying the doctrine by frankly assessing the
application of those policies to the nuanced factual settings of individual cases.

market goods. See generally Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, Monopoly with Resale,
37 RAND J. ECON. 362 (2006) (modeling interactions between monopolist sellers in a
primary market and buyers in primary and secondary markets).
123. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227-28 (2010).

